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Implementation of a surgical unit-based
safety programme in African hospitals: a
multicentre qualitative study
Lauren Clack1* , Ursina Willi1, Sean Berenholtz2, Alexander M. Aiken3, Benedetta Allegranzi4† and Hugo Sax1†
Abstract
Background: A Surgical Unit-based Safety Programme (SUSP) has been shown to improve perioperative prevention
practices and to reduce surgical site infections (SSI). It is critical to understand the factors influencing the successful
implementation of the SUSP approach in low- and middle-income settings. We undertook a qualitative study to
assess viability, and understand facilitators and barriers to implementing the SUSP approach in 5 African hospitals.
Methods: Qualitative study based on interviews with individuals from all hospitals participating in a WHO-
coordinated before-after SUSP study. The SUSP intervention consisted of a multimodal strategy including multiple
SSI prevention measures combined with an adaptive approach aimed at improving teamwork and safety culture.
Results: Thirteen interviews (5 head surgeons, 3 surgeons, 5 nurses) were conducted with staff from five hospital
sites. Identified facilitators included influential individuals (intrinsic motivation of local SUSP teams, boundary
spanners, multidisciplinary engagement, active leadership support), peer-to-peer learning (hospital networking and
positive deviance, benchmarking), implementation fitness (enabling infrastructures, momentum from previous
projects), and timely feedback of infection rates and process indicators. Barriers (organisational ‘constipators’,
workload, mistrust, turnover) and local solutions to these were also identified.
Conclusions: Participating hospitals benefitted from the SUSP programme structures (e.g. surveillance, hospital
networks, formation of multidisciplinary teams) and adaptive tools (e.g. learning from defects, executive rounds
guide) to change perceptions around patient safety and improve behaviours to prevent SSI. The combination of
technical and adaptive elements represents a promising approach to facilitate the introduction of evidence-based
best practices and to improve safety culture through local team engagement in resource-limited settings.
Keywords: Surgical site infection, Infection prevention, Implementation science
Background
Healthcare associated infections (HAIs) represent one of
the most frequent adverse events affecting patient safety
worldwide [1]. Surgical site infections (SSI) are the most
surveyed and most frequent type of HAI in low- and
middle-income countries (LMICs) as well as Europe and
the United States (US) [2–6]. In the recently published
African Surgical Outcomes Study, infection was the
most frequent postoperative complication, affecting
10.2% of patients [6]. By contrast, SSI rates in
high-income countries vary between 1.2 and 5.2% [3].
In light of the global burden of SSI, their reduction is
a priority [7]. Specifically, a Surgical Unit-based Safety
Programme (SUSP) has been developed by the American
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality to reduce
SSI and other surgical complications [8]. The SUSP ap-
proach is based on the use of both technical and adap-
tive strategies and tools to enhance local safety culture
and empower front-line care providers to address pre-
ventable harm [9]. Implementation of similar multifa-
ceted approaches have been associated with significant
and sustained reductions in HAIs and improvements in
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safety culture in high-income countries [9–13]. A sub-
stantial knowledge gap exists, however, regarding imple-
mentation of strategies to reduce SSIs in LMICs, and
sub-Saharan Africa in particular [14]. It is well recog-
nised that contextual factors, such as local patient safety
culture, play a role in the successful implementation of
evidence-based practices [15–17]. Accordingly, the
successful implementation of specific improvement ap-
proaches in US hospitals alone does not guarantee its suc-
cess in other settings [18]. To test the validity of the SUSP
approach in other settings, the World Health Organisation
(WHO) Service Delivery and Safety in collaboration with
Johns Hopkins Medicine Armstrong Institute for Patient
Safety and Quality have, beginning in 2013, partnered with
experts and frontline providers in a group of African hos-
pitals to adapt and test the impact of the SUSP approach
through a multicentre before-after cohort study in five
sub-Saharan African hospitals [19].
We performed an interview-based, qualitative study in
all five African hospitals participating in the aforemen-
tioned SUSP Study [19] to draw meaning from their ex-
periences and inform how the SUSP programme may
best be adapted for use in additional settings. This re-
search was guided by two primary study questions: What
are the facilitators and barriers to implementation of a
comprehensive unit-based safety programme to reduce
surgical site infections in these five African hospitals?
What influence, if any, did SUSP have on the safety cul-
ture in participating hospitals?
Methods
The SUSP study intervention
The multimodal SUSP intervention in five sub-Saharan
African hospitals (study hospitals) combined technical
elements (six technical SSI prevention measures to be
implemented or improved) and adaptive elements (im-
plementation and monitoring tools) to enhance patient
safety culture by changing the attitudes, values and be-
liefs of people who deliver care (Table 1) [8]. Prior to
implementation, the WHO and Johns Hopkins Arm-
strong Institute for Patient Safety and Quality worked
with senior surgeons (surgical team leaders) from study
hospitals to adapt and co-develop the SUSP tools and
protocols. A small budget was provided to each hospital
to be used only for costs incurred from data collection
extending beyond normal clinical services. These funds
were not used for procurement of equipment or prod-
ucts related to the project or for remuneration of
pre-existing staff. Local core SUSP teams were estab-
lished at each participating study hospital. These local
teams were composed of a surgical team leader as well
as nurse and surgeon “champions”, defined as individ-
uals responsible for advocating local implementation of
the SUSP intervention among their colleagues. Local
teams were entirely responsible for adaptation and im-
plementation of the SUSP intervention, with staff from
WHO forming a central coordinating team and provid-
ing technical expertise on project management and data
collection [19].
Participants
All five African hospitals included in the SUSP interven-
tion study [19] were also included in the qualitative
study (Table 2). We conducted semi-structured inter-
views with 2–3 individuals from each hospital who were
closely involved in implementation activities and there-
fore purposefully selected to provide the richest descrip-
tion of implementation experiences. These interviewee
participants were members of the local core SUSP teams
from each hospital, e.g. the surgical team leaders,
surgeon champions, and nurse champions.
Data collection procedure
Interviews were conducted during a three-day meeting at
the conclusion of the project by two independent
researchers (LC, VG) who had not been involved in the
SUSP project implementation. All interviews were audio-
recorded, lasted approximately one hour and followed a
Table 1 Intervention implementation activities
Technical SSI Preventative Measures1 Adaptive Elements2
• Preoperative patient bathing
• Avoiding hair removal or performing it with clippers
• Optimisation of surgical site skin preparation
• Optimisation of surgical hand preparation
• Optimisation of surgical antibiotic prophylaxis (timing, dose,
type of antibiotic, re-dosing)
• Improving discipline in the operating room (limiting number
of people and door opening during operation)
• Formation of local SUSP perioperative team
• Hospital survey on patient safety, to raise awareness
and assess current status of patient safety culture
• Patient safety video played by local surgical leaders
• CUSP adaptive tools:
o Staff safety assessment
o Learning from defects
• Morbidity and mortality meetings
• Participation in monthly multisite SUSP webinars
• Conduct of local educational meetings
• Feedback of data on SSI surveillance and compliance
with SSI preventive measures
SSI = survival site infection. SUSP=Surgical Unit-Based Safety Programme. CUSP=Comprehensive Unit-Based Safety Programme [1].Support materials related to the
technical SSI preventive measures are available at https://www.who.int/infection-prevention/countries/surgical/en/ [2]. Materials from the CUSP study used in this
project are available at https://www.ahrq.gov/professionals/quality-patient-safety/hais/tools/surgery/index.html
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semi-structured interview guide, which addressed individ-
ual SUSP involvement, the SSI prevention intervention, key
individuals and leadership support, data collection and
sharing, patient safety culture, and the overall SUSP experi-
ence (Table 3). All audio-recordings were transcribed ver-
batim and included in the analysis.
Ethics approval
Participation was voluntary and participants were free to
withdraw from the interview at any time. All interviewees
provided written informed consent. This qualitative study
was considered by the WHO Ethics Review Committee
(ERC) as exempted from ERC review. The SUSP interven-
tion was approved by ERC (RPC632, WHO HQ ERC) and
the institutional ethics committees of all five participating
hospitals. To ensure confidentiality of our participants, we
report our qualitative findings in aggregate form that does
not identify hospitals or individuals.
Analysis
Data collection and analysis followed an iterative ap-
proach whereby preliminary review of data influenced
ongoing data collection. When data collection was con-
cluded, an inductive analysis was conducted whereby
two researchers (LC, UW) began by reading interview
transcripts and establishing a codebook. Both re-
searchers then independently read and coded all tran-
scripts, meeting periodically to discuss the coded
transcripts, adjust the codebook, and settle any coding
discrepancies through consensus discussions. Thematic
analyses were first conducted at the hospital site level to
better understand the dynamics of the implementation
process at each hospital. Finally, cross-case analyses were
conducted using structured matrices to identify how bar-
riers and facilitators were manifest across sites [20].
To validate credibility of our findings, we performed
‘member checking’ [21] by sharing our preliminary inter-
pretations with interview participants. This process con-
sisted of a structured presentation of our findings
followed by group discussion with local core SUSP
teams from all five hospitals. Participants were invited to
provide feedback on our initial interpretations and to
add or modify our accounts to ensure that they accur-
ately reflected their reality.
Sensitising framework
This inquiry was informed theoretically by the Consoli-
dated Framework for Implementation Research (CFIR), a
collection of constructs within five domains (interven-
tion characteristics, outer setting, inner setting, charac-
teristics of individuals involved, and implementation
process) which have been shown to influence implemen-
tation effectiveness [22]. This framework served as a
sensitising scheme [23], particularly for establishing the
interview guide and orienting the inductive analysis;
however, our data collection was designed to capture a
broad range of experiences, not limited to those ad-
dressed by this framework.
Results
A total of 13 interviews were conducted across five hos-
pital sites. Interviewees included team leaders (n = 5,
39%), surgeon champions (n = 3, 23%), and nurse cham-
pions (n = 5, 39%). None of the invited interviewees
Table 2 Characteristics of participating hospitals
Country Type Setting
Kenya Private, mission hospital, 360 beds Rural
Uganda Public sector, tertiary referral, 1500 beds Urban
Uganda Private, mission hospital, 260 beds Rural
Zambia Public sector, tertiary referral, 851 beds Urban
Zimbabwe Public sector, tertiary referral, 1500 beds Urban
Table 3 Semi-structured interview guide
SUSP Involvement
How did you first become involved in the project?
When you first learned about the project, what were your expectations?
Who decided that your hospital participates and why?
SSI Prevention intervention
Think about your SSI prevention intervention. Can you walk me through
the intervention effort?
What elements of your SSI prevention intervention did you perceive
as most useful in your setting?
What elements of your SSI prevention intervention were most difficult
to implement, if any?
Key individuals/Leadership support
Who was involved in your SSI intervention team?
Who would you say was most supportive to the SUSP project?
In what way, if at all, did leadership support or hinder the intervention?
Data Review and Sharing
How did people in the hospital hear about the results of the SUSP
effort, if at all?
What problems, if any, have you had with getting the data you needed?
Safety Culture
What did you think of the HSOPS survey questions?
Have you noticed any change in the patient safety culture in your
institution?
Aside from this project, do you have any other patient safety
programs in your hospital?
Your SUSP experience (wrap-up)
What do you think the SUSP experience represented for your
unit/facility?
What do you think the SUSP experience represented for you
personally as a health professional?
Abbreviations: SUSP=Surgical Unit-Based Safety Programme. SSI = surgical
site infection. HSOPS=Hospital survey on patient safety
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declined to participate. We identified several facilitators
and barriers that were critical to the implementation
process (Table 4). These facilitators, barriers, and local
solutions identified to overcome barriers, are presented
in the following sections. Finally, the impact on local
safety culture is discussed.
Facilitators
Influential individuals
Individuals played a central role in facilitating imple-
mentation of the SUSP interventions throughout the im-
plementation process: passionate and highly-motivated
individuals were identified to be part of local core SUSP
teams and drive local change, boundary spanning indi-
viduals helped to break down organisational restrictions
and accelerate change across their organisation, and in-
dividual members of hospital leadership facilitated pur-
chasing of necessary materials and infrastructures.
Local core SUSP teams The establishment of local,
multidisciplinary core SUSP teams composed of “pas-
sionate”, “courageous”, and “intrinsically motivated” in-
dividuals was cited as a central facilitator to
implementation of the SUSP interventions. These indi-
viduals were the driving force of the SUSP interventions
in their respective hospitals and they channelled their in-
trinsic motivation and perseverance to overcome chal-
lenges faced during the SUSP implementation.
A nurse champion explained, “You need to be
courageous. Actually when you are implementing
something, you have to put your foot down. It's not
easy.”
Boundary spanners Boundary spanners, defined as indi-
viduals who have multiple roles and traverse institutional
boundaries [24], facilitated implementation by accelerat-
ing change across departments and establishing buy-in
with multiple stakeholders. Several of the SUSP surgical
team leaders were also members of their hospital leader-
ship. Such individuals enabled hierarchical boundary
spanning and particularly facilitated the purchase of ma-
terials, such as sterile drapes and chlorhexidine antisep-
tic, and installation of infrastructures, such as showers,
necessary for the SUSP project.
One boundary spanning team leader described, “I got
the senior management team, because I was seated in
the same room, to agree that this was good for the
Table 4 Identified facilitators and barriers
Facilitators
Influential individuals Characteristics of individuals in
local core SUSP team
The personal commitment and motivation of the individuals primarily responsible for
implementing the SUSP intervention
Boundary spanners The involvement of individuals who have multiple roles and traverse institutional
boundaries to accelerate change and gain broad stakeholder engagement
Active leadership support Individuals in leadership positions demonstrating their support for the project
through their physical presence and making resources available
Peer-to-peer learning across
participating hospitals
Hospital networking and
positive deviance
Opportunities throughout the project to exchange in-person or virtually with individ-
uals from other hospitals and learn from examples of positive deviance
Implementation fitness Momentum Building on the energy that was already channelled towards quality improvement
thanks to previous projects
Enabling infrastructures Benefitting from knowledge, surveillance systems, and practices already in place
because of previous quality improvement initiatives was a foundation to support the
introduction of new practices
Timely feedback Tension for change The feedback of sub-optimal baseline data showing room for improvement to create
a sense of urgency to change practice
Ongoing feedback Regular feedback of infection rates and process indicators throughout the project to
sustain engagement
Barriers
Organisational constipators Lack of leadership support that stifles the efforts of other individuals to effect change
Workload The significant SUSP workload was often taken on by SUSP core team members in
addition to their pre-existing duties
Mistrust Lack of financial incentives in the current project, as had come to be expected in
previous projects, led to scepticism
Staff turnover The rapid turnover of surgical staff created difficulties to keep everyone trained on
SUSP protocols
SUSP=Surgical Unit-Based Safety Programme
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hospital, good for our patients and that it was cost
effective.”
Local SUSP team members also actively spanned
boundaries by seeking input from additional stake-
holders, such as pharmacists, cleaning staff, theatre staff,
and other surgeons. This helped establish broad commit-
ment to the project and brought to attention areas for
improvement that hadn’t previously been considered.
According to a surgeon champion, “[if] you want to
change the antibiotic use, you get the pharmacists
involved because those are the owners of the
antibiotics. …then it's not like you're telling the
pharmacist what to do, but the pharmacist is saying,
‘okay, this is what we're going to be doing’.”
Active leadership support Members of hospital leader-
ship who demonstrated their active support, for example
through participation in executive rounds and facilitating
the purchase of materials necessary for the intervention,
were facilitators. The adaptive SUSP tool for leading ex-
ecutive rounds [25], which involved a senior executive
walk-through of the clinical area led by a frontline clin-
ician, was further cited as a facilitator to engaging hos-
pital leadership to gain their support.
A surgeon champion explained, “[our director] would
come [on the executive rounds] and there are places in
the hospital he had never set foot. …he would just be
shaking his head saying, ‘well, I didn't know this
happens in this hospital.’ …and we would get results
almost instantly.”
A nurse champion described, “when we were doing
executive rounds, we found that nurses were using
containers to bathe patients and there were no
showers….within 24 hours [of the executive round],
everything was cleared, there were instant showers.”
In contrast, a lack of concrete leadership support was
cited as a major barrier to SUSP implementation, as later
discussed under ‘Barriers’.
Peer-to-peer learning across participating hospitals
Throughout their participation in the SUSP programme,
hospitals had several opportunities to meet and interact,
both in person and virtually, with individuals from other
participating hospitals during networking events and vir-
tual webinars.
Networking events The multiple networking events
throughout the project created opportunities for core
SUSP team members to exchange about their experiences
and enabled “positive deviance” [26], whereby hospitals
could learn from and emulate the success of their peers.
A nurse champion described, “[the kick-off meeting
was] an eye-opener for us. Because you meet with dif-
ferent people from different sites, you hear how they do
their way, we share our experiences.”
A team leader shared, “we had a meeting with [head
surgeon from another SUSP hospital]. They had
already launched, so he was good support.”
Virtual webinars The monthly webinars (internet-based
meetings and presentations) also created friendly competi-
tion between hospitals and an opportunity to discuss and
identify solutions to the challenges they were facing. This
exchange forum also helped participating hospitals to es-
tablish synergies, for example purchasing alcohol-based
hand rub from the same producer to reduce costs.
A team leader said, “so we sit and we just say, ‘Guys,
this is how well we’ve done. We did a webinar and we
are behind all the other hospitals. Don’t let
[neighbouring hospital] beat us!”
Another team leader described, “when we had an
alcohol-based hand rub challenge, we communicated
with [another hospital] and discovered that well they
have the same problem. We agreed that now we all get
alcohol from the same place, which is even cheaper
and can be [purchased] in bigger quantities.”
Implementation fitness
Implementation fitness, an institution’s ability to inte-
grate evidence-based recommendations into practice,
was strengthened in some hospitals that had previously
participated in quality improvement initiatives and had
therefore already established momentum and enabling
infrastructures.
Momentum Interviewees described that participation in
SUSP helped them to “maintain the momentum” that
had been established through participation in previous
initiatives. For example, two hospitals had been involved
in the African Partnership for Patient Safety (APPS) pro-
ject that had been initiated three years prior, which
aimed to support patient safety improvements through
hospital-to-hospital partnerships [27].
One team leader recalled, “During APPS there was a
lot of Science of Patient Safety training. Of course there
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was so much resistance. Many things were really big
shifts for us. Then [SUSP] was the best thing for us
because at that time we were just closing the project
with APPS… so we thought this was going to help us to
also maintain the general awareness around patient
safety.”
Enabling infrastructures Interviewees further shared
that experience with previous research and quality im-
provement initiatives meant they had already established
‘enabling infrastructures’, such as surveillance and pa-
tient follow-up systems and surgical checklists, which fa-
cilitated SUSP implementation.
A nurse champion described, “I have also worked in
other international research projects. So, even when it
came to surveillance and follow-up of patients on the
SUSP project, it was not hard because it was some-
thing I had done before.”
Timely feedback
Regular feedback of data on SSI surveillance and compli-
ance with SSI preventive measures was an important fa-
cilitator, particularly to create a tension for change at the
beginning of the project and to sustain engagement
through ongoing feedback throughout the project.
Tension for change During the intervention kick-off
meeting, feedback of sub-optimal baseline data on SSI
rates was a catalyst, creating tension for change and a
sense of urgency among colleagues.
A nurse champion described, “so that’s how our
intervention began…we shared with them the results of
the baseline phase, and man they said, ‘“Eh, we are
doing poorly. What do we do then?” They got
concerned. They got into the thing!”
Ongoing feedback Regular feedback of results, both SSI
rates and compliance with SSI preventive measures,
throughout the implementation helped to demonstrate
the effectiveness of actions taken and to sustain engage-
ment in the project. Such ongoing feedback was especially
critical to establishing confidence in components of the
SUSP intervention, such as limiting post-operative antibi-
otics, of which colleagues were sceptical of the safety.
A surgeon champion shared, “We had another session
about three months into the intervention and we
showed that the number of patients who got post-
operative infections was reducing. At the same time
the number of patients who were getting post-operative
antibiotics was also reducing. I think that was in a
way enough to convince people.”
Barriers
Organisational constipators
Whereas positive leadership was a facilitator, a lack of
active leadership support was a clear barrier, particularly
when hospital leadership claimed to be supportive of the
programme, but failed to take concrete actions to dem-
onstrate their support. Such individuals have been
termed organisational ‘constipators’ [28].
One team leader described, “I think [the hospital
director] was already on board, but they are pulled
apart by too many demands on their time… We just
couldn’t get them to be more involved.”
This became a concrete barrier to implementation, as
described by the team leader, “whereas the people on
the ground seem to be willing to do more, or have
done a lot, I think they have reached a point where
they would need more help from people above them to
try and get more done.”
The lack of leadership support in this scenario effectively
stifled, or ‘constipated’, the efforts already made by other
team members.
Local solution Interviewees mentioned that adaptive
tools to guide executive rounds helped overcome the
challenge of getting executives on the wards. Executive
rounds helped to make leadership acutely aware of
on-the-ground challenges and motivate them to support
SUSP implementation.
A surgeon champion described, “having something
formal and something to follow is helpful. I think if it
just went without a guided tool or anything, I’m sure
[it] would have made too much noise.”
Workload
Implementation of SUSP activities involved an increased
workload, particularly for the core SUSP team, which
was a barrier to implementation. Individuals in the SUSP
team often took on this role in addition to their
pre-existing duties.
A nurse champion explained, “It's a lot of work. And
then there are so many meetings, you have to sacrifice
a lot. At the same time, you're not expected to take
time off from your normal duties.”
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Local solution To manage the additional workload,
members of the core SUSP team often sought the assist-
ance of other staff members, to whom they delegated ac-
tivities such as data collection or creating educational
posters. The delegation of activities to other staff members
had the joint advantage of building a greater base of indi-
viduals involved in and committed to the SUSP project.
A surgeon champion said, “I did a lot of delegation to
the rest of the team to just, everybody to do their own
bit.”
Mistrust
Some SUSP core teams experienced difficulty building
the trust of staff in their hospitals – particularly regard-
ing the repartition of funds that were provided to each
participating hospital. Although these funds were not
used for remuneration of pre-existing staff, some col-
leagues nonetheless suspected that the SUSP core team
was receiving financial incentives. Colleagues with such
suspicions were sometimes unwilling to participate in
the project and this created “distance” between the SUSP
core team and the hospital staff.
One team leader described, “I think there’s a general
[perception] that most research projects have a lot of
money… If [my colleagues] don’t see obvious money
reaching them as well, they feel you are holding and
keeping it to yourself.”
This mistrust was further exacerbated by previous pro-
jects that had provided financial incentives in exchange
for individual participation, for example returning forms.
A nurse champion described, “As it has been
happening, whenever there is a project, there are some
incentives. So for this one, wherever I told them that
there's literally nothing, they couldn't believe it.”
Such financial incentives provided in previous studies
were misleading – causing staff to expect monetary re-
wards for their efforts and thus to mistrust projects
without financial rewards.
Local solution Instead of financial incentives, some
SUSP hospitals expressed appreciation in the form of
non-financial incentives and symbols of appreciation,
such as breakfast and snacks during SUSP presentations
to motivate their staff and incite them to attend.
A team leader described, “just something small. Like
breakfast, tea, snacks... To show you value them and
their time.”
Staff turnover
High staff turnover was frequently cited as a barrier to
implementation of the SUSP interventions – particularly
to keeping new staff trained on SUSP protocols and the
science of patient safety.
A nurse champion described, “We have a high
turnover in our hospital, especially the nurses. They
are always looking for greener pastures. So, every time
you educate this group about the science of safety, do
not shave, how you're supposed to do the bathing, then
after that, they are gone.”
Local solution In light of frequent turnover, multiple
hospitals implemented continuous education of newly
arriving staff to maintain awareness about the SUSP
programme and protocols.
A team leader said, “now we’re trying to get a policy
whereby the newly recruited staff is given training on
patient safety.”
Patient safety culture
Our qualitative study also aimed to identify what impact,
if any, SUSP had on local patient safety culture in par-
ticipating hospitals. When reflecting on patient safety in
their hospitals, interviewees frequently mentioned that
patient safety had not been widely thematised prior to
the SUSP interventions and that, with some exceptions,
few specific actions had previously been undertaken to
improve local patient safety culture. Interviewees further
recalled specific challenges to promoting patient safety,
such as ambivalence about adverse events and a culture
where individuals were blamed and seen as the source of
adverse events.
A surgeon champion described, “unfortunately, where
we work, [patient safety] is not something that's
emphasised… any adverse events are just looked at
like – it's just something that happens. No one really
tries to look back and think, what could we have done
to make a difference in this.”
Another surgeon champion described, “the mentality
is always if something’s wrong, then there’s someone to
blame.”
Following the implementation of SUSP, however, inter-
viewees described an improvement in certain aspects of
patient safety culture, which they described as being a dir-
ect result of the adaptive SUSP elements. For example,
several hospitals established morbidity and mortality
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meetings as an occasion to reflect on the system-level
causes of adverse events. During these meetings, the adap-
tive tools, such as “Learning from Defects” [29], were cited
as useful tools to shift blame away from individuals and to
focus on the system-routed issues to be addressed. In gen-
eral, a learning curve was observed, whereby increasing
awareness about patient safety issues resulted in a gradual
shift in patient safety culture. Despite the felt progress, in-
terviewees still noted room for improvement in areas such
as speaking up, and not assigning blame.
Perhaps one of the “greatest successes”, as described
by a surgeon champion, was, “getting people to think
about patient safety. …[whereas previously] at the very
remote back of your mind you would think about it
but not really have a way of bringing it out but at
least now there is a way of bringing it out. For me
that's the greatest success is the awareness that patient
safety is an issue and there's something that can be
done about it to just improve patient safety.”
Discussion
This qualitative study draws on the experience of five
African hospitals and reveals the following key facilita-
tors to implementation of the SUSP programme: influen-
tial individuals, who spanned boundaries to accelerate
change and establish support for the intervention among
colleagues and hospital leadership; peer-to-peer learning
across participating hospitals, which fostered synergies
and positive deviance across institutions; implementation
fitness, where hospitals built on the momentum and en-
abling infrastructures that had been established through
previous quality improvement initiatives; and timely
feedback of data, which established tension for change
among participants and sustained project engagement.
Whereas barriers such as organisational constipators,
workload, mistrust and staff turnover challenged imple-
mentation in some hospitals, much can also be learned
from the locally developed solutions. These included
using the SUSP adaptive tools to engage reticent hospital
leaders, delegating SUSP tasks to distribute workload,
avoiding financial incentives in favour of symbolic ges-
tures of appreciation, and continuous staff training.
Our findings support the conclusions of previous and re-
cent systematic reviews also highlighting the importance of
leadership support, multidisciplinary engagement, ongoing
staff training and performance evaluation and feedback as
critical components of effective implementation of surgical
checklists and SSI prevention interventions [30–32]. Spe-
cifically, a 2015 review and thematic synthesis of qualitative
evidence by Bergs et al., in which 2 of 18 included studies
reported data from LMICs, found that “executive leader-
ship”, “organisational culture” and “communication and
teamwork” were the most frequently reported elements of
local context that influenced implementation of surgical
checklists [30]. The authors concluded that implementa-
tion of surgical checklists requires more than eliminating
isolated barriers and supporting facilitators and that, in-
stead, implementation leaders should foster shared motiv-
ation and work together with staff to adapt existing
routines. These conclusions are supported by our findings
and further justify the comprehensive SUSP approach,
which combines technical and adaptive elements to facili-
tate the introduction of evidence-based best practices while
working to improve safety culture.
Our findings about the important role of hospital net-
works builds on the findings of Dixon-Woods and
others, who found that establishing quality improvement
networks with “strong horizontal links” across hospitals
supported implementation by exerting normative pres-
sure on members [24, 33]. We additionally found that
participation in the SUSP network supported implemen-
tation by enabling peer-to-peer learning and supporting
the identification of synergies across hospitals. A study
by Aveling and colleagues comparing implementation of
the safe surgery checklist in high- and low-income coun-
tries revealed that African hospitals faced more chal-
lenges to implement the checklist than sites in the
United Kingdom because they lacked features that sup-
ported the implementation, such as pre-existing data
collection and audit systems [34]. This is consistent with
our observation that implementation fitness thanks to
previous participation in quality improvement initiatives
helps to establish enabling infrastructures that facilitate
the implementation of best practices. Finally, our results
are consistent with Mathauer and Imhoff, who found fi-
nancial incentives were limited in their effectiveness and
sustainability for increasing motivation of health profes-
sionals in Benin and Kenya, thereby supporting the con-
clusion that financial incentives should be avoided and
non-financial gestures of appreciation or other measures
to promote intrinsic motivation should be favoured as
part of a holistic quality management model [35].
Similar to Ente and colleagues, who found that 75% of
healthcare professionals surveyed in Western Nigeria
and Northern Uganda attributed adverse events to indi-
vidual mistakes [36], interviewees in our study described
a baseline culture of individual blame and ambivalence,
where adverse events were not regularly discussed, much
less examined to identify learning opportunities. The
major improvement in safety culture was thus having
the tools and the language necessary to identify and
learn from patient safety issues that would have formerly
been dismissed.
Our study findings should be interpreted in light of
some limitations. This qualitative inquiry was conducted
at the conclusion of the intervention period; it is
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possible that interviewees’ recollection of certain events
could be influenced by subsequent events or by inter-
pretation of study outcomes. Due to the nature of data
collection, interviews were limited to individuals who
were actively involved in planning and implementation
of the SUSP intervention in their respective hospitals.
Further interviews with other project stakeholders may
have revealed additional insights.
A strength of this study is that this research was led by
a team of researchers purposefully not having been in-
volved in SUSP implementation so as not to bias our
findings. The different cultural background of the re-
searchers further justified the use of member checking,
in which we shared our preliminary findings with re-
search participants to ensure their credibility from the
perspectives of those who live and work in the studied
context [37].
Conclusions
We conclude that a complex combination of local con-
textual factors, rather than isolated barriers and facilita-
tors, influenced implementation in these 5 African
hospitals. Namely, leveraging the intrinsic motivation of
clinical leaders was key to SUSP implementation in these
five hospitals. These individuals spanned organisational
boundaries to establish broad support for the SUSP
programme, building on enabling infrastructures (e.g.
surveillance, hospital networks, formation of multidis-
ciplinary teams) and adaptive tools (e.g. learning from
defects, executive rounds guide) to change perceptions
and behaviours to prevent SSI. Availability of qualitative
information on factors influencing implementation and
uptake of IPC interventions in settings with limited re-
sources is scarce and thus, the lessons learned in these
hospitals are critical for the future adaption of the SUSP
project and for other quality improvement work in other
resource-limited settings. The combination of technical
and adaptive elements represents a promising approach
to facilitate the introduction of evidence-based best
practices and to improve safety culture through local
team engagement in resource-limited settings. This is
also useful to inspire global strategies for SSI prevention
implementation.
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